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CONFUCIANIZING SOCRATES AND SOCRATIZING 
CONFUCIUS: ON COMPARING ANALECTS 13:18 AND 
THE EUTHYPHRO
Tim Murphy
Faculty of Law and Social Sciences, University of Akureyri
Ralph Weber
URPP Asia and Europe, University of Zurich
Although the traditions of Chinese and Western philosophy are sometimes regarded 
as incommensurable, philosophers and others have long been fascinated with the 
comparative study of how these traditions approach philosophical issues. Particularly 
fertile ground for such analysis is provided when thinkers from both traditions address 
the same or similar questions, and it is therefore unsurprising that an apparently quite 
specific question that was addressed by both Confucius (551–479 B.C.) and Socrates 
(469–399 B.C.) has attracted much attention. Their respective responses to the ques-
tion of how a son should respond if his father commits a crime are found in Confu-
cius’ Analects 13:18 and in Plato’s Euthyphro. The aim of this essay is to assess three 
comparative analyses of these responses with particular reference to their underlying 
assertions of commonality. By “assertions of commonality” we mean assumptions or 
presuppositions of commonality that serve to justify the comparative exercise in the 
first instance. This essay, therefore, is primarily about methodology, but we shall also 
discuss—necessarily, given the subject matter—aspects of filial piety.
The essay is in four parts. We first introduce the passages in which Confucius 
and Socrates address the question as to how a son should respond to a delinquent 
father. As we shall see, the response of Confucius focuses specifically on the issue 
of xiao (filial piety) in the concrete situation presented to him, whereas Socrates 
uses the issue of hosion (piety) as a means of investigating a different, broader is-
sue. We then examine two comparisons that assert commonality between the two 
classical responses from a Confucian standpoint, one by Rui Zhu and another by 
Greg Whitlock.1 These writers may be said to “Confucianize” Socrates because they 
undertake comparative analysis on the basis of the presupposition that both passages 
are primarily about only what the passage in the Analects is about. We then turn to a 
comparison that constructs commonality between Socrates and Confucius from a So-
cratic standpoint. We suggest that Jiyuan Yu “Socratizes” Confucius to the extent that 
he proceeds from the understanding that both passages may be compared in light of 
the broader issue addressed by Socrates only, namely what is known philosophically 
as “the Euthyphro dilemma.”2 Finally, we offer some brief observations regarding 
comparative philosophical analysis in general and about comparing the responses of 
Confucius and Socrates in these passages in particular.
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Addressing the Father-Son Relation: Confucius and Socrates
In Analects (Lunyu) 13:18 Confucius addresses the question of how a son should 
respond in the case of the father’s misdemeanor when his interlocutor observes that 
an upright man in such a situation bore witness against his father:
The Governor of She said to Confucius, “In our village there is a man nicknamed ‘Straight 
Body.’ When his father stole a sheep, he gave evidence against him.” Confucius an-
swered, “In our village those who are straight are quite different. Fathers cover up for their 
sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. Straightness is to be found in such behaviour.”3
Against a background of some disputes regarding translation,4 recent scholarship has 
interpreted this passage to mean either of two things. Many simply take Confucius as 
saying that to report one’s own father is not—meaning never and nowhere—upright. 
Others think that Confucius must be understood more contextually and take him to 
be against reporting one’s own father only in the specific context of the case upon 
which he is commenting; the passage, for instance, has been interpreted as exem-
plary of the role that Confucian ethics—in the absence of an “abstract standard by 
which to resolve the conflict of values”—accords to “individual choice.”5 Different 
views also exist as to Confucius’ reasoning. Some are of the opinion that Confucius 
thinks that stealing a sheep is not a crime serious enough to justify denouncing one’s 
own father to the state authorities. Others suggest that he thinks that this is not the 
way a son should attempt to correct his father’s wayward behavior. Yet another view 
is that Confucius is making the point that in his village—that is, somewhere in the 
state of Lu—the matter would be treated differently, without explicitly condemning 
the action taken in the concrete case. In short, the interpretation of Analects 13:18 
depends greatly on how one understands the Analects and Confucianism in general, 
particularly as regards the nature of its truth claims and the contextuality or universal-
ity of single statements.
In the Euthyphro, one of Plato’s (ca. 428–347 B.C.) Socratic dialogues, Euthyphro 
meets Socrates outside the court and tells him that he is on his way to pursue a suit 
against his father for killing a household slave. Euthyphro’s father had bound the 
slave and thrown him in a ditch because the slave had killed another household 
slave; Euthyphro’s father had then sent to Athens to ask of a diviner what should 
be done with him, but in the meantime the slave had died, bound and unattended 
in the ditch. The encounter with Euthyphro prompts Socrates (who himself has just 
been indicted) to engage in his typical philosophical activity, namely “elenchus” or 
“elenctic examination.” In the Socratic dialogues, this indirect pedagogical process 
always leads the interlocutor to question and refine his initial position.
On hearing of the charge about to be brought by Euthyphro, Socrates adopts 
his typically skeptical stance and observes that only a man of high wisdom knows 
how to prosecute his father righteously. In their subsequent discussion of Euthyphro’s 
intentions and the charges faced by Socrates, Socrates questions Euthyphro on the 
nature of piety and impiety. Euthyphro’s initial response is that piety
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is to do what I am doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer, be it about murder or temple 
robbery or anything else, whether the wrongdoer is your father or your mother or anyone 
else; not to prosecute is impious.6
When questioned further by Socrates, Euthyphro accepts the limitations of this re-
sponse, and the remainder of the dialogue constitutes discussion of other possible 
meanings of piety and impiety. Euthyphro’s uncertainty regarding the nature of
piety suggests to the reader that he does not appear to have the wisdom necessary to 
pursue the suit against his father, but this turns out not to be the point: Euthyphro’s 
situation is basically a pretext in the dialogue for discussion of a broader issue and 
Socrates’ formulation of the influential “Euthyphro dilemma.”
The Euthyphro dilemma is one of the central dilemmas in the Western philo-
sophical and theological traditions. In the course of the dialogue, Euthyphro, after 
he has abandoned his original definition of piety, suggests the following alternative 
definition: that what any one or some of the gods agree in approving is the holy or the 
pious. When Socrates raises questions regarding that definition, Euthyphro responds 
by acknowledging that it must be the case that what all the gods agree in approving 
is the holy or the pious. At this point Socrates interjects with the question known as 
“the Euthyphro dilemma”: “Is the pious being loved by the gods because it is pious, 
or is it pious because it is being loved by the gods?”7
In ethical terms, this dilemma goes beyond any question as to the meaning of 
“piety”—“good,” for example, or “holy,” can replace “piety” as the issue at stake in 
the dilemma—and refers to the source of moral authority: it raises the issue of primacy 
as between nature and a superior will, and therefore between what may be rationally 
discoverable and what is commanded. If one takes the view that what is pious is
pious “because it is being loved by the gods,” then one is responding to the dilemma 
in voluntarist terms—one is considering the source of moral authority to be pure will 
or command. Voluntarism views reason and intellect as subservient to will and is the 
basis for what is often referred to as “command theory,” within which the command 
of sovereign to subject is the central element. If, on the other hand, one considers that 
what is pious is “being loved by the gods because it is pious” then moral authority—the 
judgment that something is pious—must be conceived in rationalist terms. According 
to this view, in order to judge that something is pious, one can and must discover this, 
using one’s reason and intellect.
These issues first assumed real significance in the Western philosophical tra-
dition in the context of early and medieval Christian theology. The early Church 
Fathers, including St. Augustine (A.D. 354–430), adopted a voluntarist position vis-
à-vis the Euthyphro dilemma. By contrast, St. Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225–1274), the 
thirteenth-century theologian whose work dominated medieval theology, responded 
to the dilemma in Christian rationalist terms. William of Occam (1290–1349) formu-
lated an understanding of the relationship between divine power and the creation that 
was again—that is, essentially similar to St. Augustine and the other Church Fathers—
voluntarist.
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The positions of, and the disagreement between, St. Thomas and Occam are of 
enormous significance in the Western philosophical tradition. While the Thomist tra-
dition underpins much contemporary virtue ethics, the ethical tradition established 
by Occam divides into three streams: the religious stream, where God’s command 
remains the criterion of action; the secular, positivist stream, where the command of 
the Sovereign replaces the command of God; and the modern natural law tradition, 
in which God’s command “becomes the innate moral law, conceived, clearly or 
confusedly, as a set of propositions.”8
Two Comparisons “Confucianizing” Socrates
The initial similarity between Analects 13:18 and Plato’s Euthyphro is that both re-
count a conversation regarding a son in some way taking the side of the civil authori-
ties against his father, further to some illegal act on the part of the father. Moreover, 
in both instances, the more prominent party to the conversation—that is, Confucius 
in the Analects and Socrates in the Euthyphro—seems to speak out against such a 
response on the part of the son. As we shall now see, Rui Zhu and Greg Whitlock 
both construct and interpret this initial similarity as a commonality from a Confucian 
standpoint: the father-son relationship, which is central to the passage in the Ana-
lects, is almost exclusively the topic of their texts. The result is an assertion of com-
monality that provides the basic justification for the comparative exercise; namely, 
that Confucius and Socrates both address the same question, and only the question, 
of filial piety (xiao).
Although Rui Zhu observes that the different stances of Confucius and Socrates 
indicate different underlying moral philosophies, and although he claims to use their 
comments only as bridges to explore early Confucian and Greek ethics, he discusses 
at great length and in far greater depth their responses to the specific question. His 
first suggestion, for example, is that Confucius and Socrates respond similarly—but 
not in exactly the same way—to the same question:
Confucius stands on the same line with Socrates but seems the more radical of the two. 
Socrates does not directly refute Euthyphro but only suggests that he makes sure he under-
stands what he is doing before going any further. . . . Confucius’s response is more rigid, 
for he categorically dismisses an act of the Euthyphroian kind. He demands that father 
and son cover up for each other in the case of either one’s guilt. Compared to Socrates, 
Confucius advocates the position that seems a little too strong and leaves no room for 
justice, while Socrates does not have that problem with justice.9
It seems odd to consider both thinkers as standing “on the same line” in a passage 
that not only focuses on differences between their perspectives but also raises more 
questions than it answers. Certainly, it is difficult to agree with Zhu when he claims 
that these are the “[plain and unproblematic] prima facie observations that we make 
from the remarks of Confucius and Socrates.”10 The view that the two thinkers are 
addressing the same question is Zhu’s basic “assertion of commonality”; he does not 
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refer at all to the Euthyphro dilemma, despite his stated interest in exploring ethics 
as a distinct theme.
Given the exclusion of the dilemma, what does Zhu say of the dialogue? Zhu 
observes—with reference to works such as Hesiod’s Theogony, Homer’s Iliad, and 
Aristophanes’ Clouds—that the notion that the father has to be overcome by the son 
is a familiar theme in Greek literature, and that this reflects a certain moral realism, 
namely the Greek willingness to acknowledge the natural or potential conflicts be-
tween father and son. Filial piety, therefore, did not represent for the Greeks what 
Zhu terms the “governing principle”—the principle that has to be yielded to if social 
or moral conflicts arise—of the father-son relation. For the Greeks the father-son rela-
tion is modeled after the human-gods relation and is imbued with ambivalence: the 
father “should be looked upon in the eyes of a boy as a godlike figure that demands 
respect and fear.”11
The Greeks’ willingness to acknowledge ambivalent sentiments toward their fa-
thers could be perceived, according to Zhu, as the reason for their upholding justice 
as the governing principle in cases of conflict: “As the highest end of rational life 
justice must not be compromised by any emotion, including love, respect or fear.”12 
In addition to this suggestion that justice is in some sense “rational,” he notes that 
justice was associated in ancient Greece with two things in the human realm: the 
concept of fates (whereby each individual is assigned shares of good and evil—one’s 
“lot”—that cannot be altered) and the effort to ensure that every civic arrangement 
has to be in accordance with the divine cosmic order established by Zeus. Zhu 
writes:
As the governing principle, justice overrides other principles if conflicts occur. This may 
mean either that a father has to abandon and leave his son in the hand of justice for the 
sake of civic order or that a son may have to bear witness against his own father, if any of 
them is guilty of injustice.13
A just charge by a son against an unjust father upholds the just principle of piety be-
cause filial piety is modeled on man’s piety to the gods, and “if a father compromises 
justice, his son’s piety to the gods overrides his filial piety.”14 A father, Zhu writes, 
“could be called impious if he has brought injustice to his son, and this would not 
make sense if it is only filial piety that matters.”15 Since piety commands a guilty 
father’s son to seek justice, Zhu argues that Euthyphro’s thinking is in line with the 
prevailing morals, and that this explains, “better than does Socrates’ usual indirect 
pedagogical style, why Socrates challenges Euthyphro on only his haste but not his 
act per se.”16
This conclusion could only be reached in an analysis that does not consider the 
broader Euthyphro dilemma. An alternative view is that Socrates challenges Euthy-
phro because he wants to discuss piety and raise a fundamental dilemma regarding 
the source of moral authority. According to this view, Socrates’ challenge to Euthyphro 
is not about either his haste or his act; rather it is a challenge to reflect on and explore 
the nature of hosion (piety) and, more fundamentally, the nature of morality. It is, in 
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other words, based on the goals of Socrates’ “usual indirect pedagogical style” in rela-
tion to a very grand philosophical theme.
Zhu’s analysis of Analects 13:18 is based on his view that it is obvious that Con-
fucius rigidly disapproves of “an act of the Euthyphroian nature.”17 Beyond his as-
sumption that the two texts address precisely the same question, he presupposes that 
there is one authoritative interpretation of Confucius’ response. We have remarked 
that interpretations of Analects 13:18 depends greatly on how one understands the 
Analects and Confucianism in general, particularly as regards the nature of its truth 
claims and the contextuality or universality of single statements. Zhu refers also to 
“Confucius’s un-Socratic explicitness and inflexibility.”18 But scholars have long em-
phasized the suggestiveness and vagueness of the Chinese language and the flexibil-
ity exhibited by Confucius. For instance, in Analects 11:22 Confucius gives different 
answers when his disciples Ranyou and Zilu both ask him whether one should act 
upon learning something; taken to task, Confucius responds: “Ranyou is diffident, 
and so I urged him on: But Zilu has the energy of two, and so I sought to rein him 
in”; and in Analects 9:4 Confucius is described as “not inflexible” (wu gu).19 Scholars 
such as Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont have argued that Confucius is decidedly 
relational and contextual in his statements.20
Despite all this, Zhu contends that “one of the staunchest maxims of early Con-
fucianism” is that a son ought to protect his guilty father even if this means cheating 
justice:
For a Confucian nothing comes above his filial piety. Confucianism does not question 
an individual’s social or legal obligation but locates filial obligation both practically and 
theoretically prior to the rest of duties. If a circumstance is such that a person could not 
fulfil his filial piety without violating his social duty, he should not be held back from 
fulfilling the filial order.21
According to Zhu the Confucian “maxim” that filial obligation comes before social 
obligation reflects the fact that “Confucian ethics takes love, specifically love be-
tween father and son, as the overriding principle, in contrast to the Greek revering 
of justice.”22 Zhu suggests that this has a threefold basis. First, in Confucianism so-
cial values emanate from family values; because the family is the site of social and 
moral cultivation, the family bond has to be stronger than the social bond in order 
for the former to support the latter. Second, moral feeling is more important than 
right or wrong in Confucianism; precedence is given to ren—human-heartedness or 
“love”—as opposed to yi—righteousness or “what one ought or ought not to do.” 
Finally, Confucian ethics considers “family love as the root of love for other people 
and the foundation of overall morality”; Confucian moral self-cultivation is therefore 
“a process of extending your feeling from within to without and from yourself to 
other people.”23
As Zhu notes, this latter “process of extending” has two aspects: zhong (loyalty), 
which is the “positive extending” (if you want to obtain something for yourself, ob-
tain it for others), and shu (consideration), which is the “negative extending” (never 
do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you). He writes:
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In order for extending to be possible there must be something to be extended. A Confu-
cian cannot avail himself of a divine order such as the one set up by Zeus in the Greek 
world . . . since Confucius professes no interest in gods and spirits. A Confucian extends 
his natural love . . . and ultimately his love derived from biological bonds. The natural 
bond between father and son is the starting point of a person’s moral cultivation and the 
solar energy powering other moral relations, for it is by this relation that they are made 
possible.24
For Zhu, “filial love” is the “governing principle in . . . Confucian ethics” and the 
“extending base of all other loves,” which he seems to subsume under the notion of 
ren (human-heartedness, “love”).25 By way of confirming the secular philosophical 
context, Zhu also observes that Confucian ethics departs from Greek ethics in that 
the former is “deliberately secular, harboring no interest in divine affairs. Man is the 
center of Confucianism.”26
There are problems with Zhu’s placing of “filial love” or “mutual love between 
father and son” above ren that appear to derive from both his basic assertion of 
commonality and his particular interpretation of Confucius. For one thing, he con-
flates “filial obligation,” “filial love,” and “love between father and son,” using these 
expressions indiscriminately. Arguments drawn from the central position of family 
values in Confucianism and from the mutual relationship between father and son (or 
parent and child) are thus turned into arguments to support his thesis of the centrality 
of filial piety, that is, the one side of the relationship emphasizing filial obligation to 
the father. Furthermore, Zhu’s search for a “governing principle” that overrides other 
principles in the case of social or moral conflict is predicated on a specific reading 
of Confucianism, for it is not at all clear whether the case for such a “Confucian 
principle” can be argued coherently. When it is argued, that “principle” is usually 
said to be ren. Tu Wei-ming, for instance, considers Wing-tsit Chan’s view that “in the 
hierarchy of values in Confucian symbolism jen [ren] occupies the central position 
around which other cardinal virtues are ordered” to be “self-evidently true.”27
Moreover, although Zhu is in line with much scholarship when saying that ren is 
rooted in and is an extension of the “love between father and son,” his inference that 
“love” is the “governing principle” seems problematic for at least two reasons. First, 
to turn the father-son relationship into a loving one of filial piety (xiao) and parental 
love (ci) is a primary and constant task to everyone striving for ren. Yet, any exclusive 
priority to this relationship will likely frustrate that very task, part of which is to ex-
tend the “love” cultivated in it to other contexts (family, community, strangers). Zhu 
himself emphasizes this “process of extending.”28 Second, the relationship between 
a son and his father is but one among many relationships that inform ren. Others 
are the relationships between a son and his mother and between brothers, and Zhu 
inadvertently concedes this. To bolster his argument for the exclusive primacy of the 
father-son relationship, he quotes Analects 1:2, where proper behavior toward “par-
ents” (in the translation that Zhu uses, this includes the mother) and elder brothers 
(xiaodi) is emphasized as the root of ren.29
To conclude, when Zhu presents filial piety “as the source of all virtues,” he is 
taken in by a historically subsequent and misguidedly politicized version of Con-
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fucianism, which singles out filial piety as the guiding and central virtue and turns 
it into an absolute obligation. By way of an analogy between father/son and ruler/
subject, this shift had assumed crucial political significance in the Han dynasty. Pre-
supposing that Analects 13:18 as well as the Euthyphro are exclusively about con-
flicting moral principles regarding filial piety, Zhu draws out differences between 
Confucius and Socrates on the basis of what he takes to be the authoritative inter-
pretation of Confucius’ response and of Confucianism in general and ignores other 
strands of interpretation, for instance the influential Mencian strand.
We turn now to a second study, which in our view also “Confucianizes” Socrates. 
Greg Whitlock’s discussion of the issue of “concealing” the misconduct of one’s 
own father is based on the same basic “assertion of commonality” between the two 
texts as Zhu’s analysis, namely that the two thinkers are concerned only with the 
narrow question of the father-son relation in the context of the father’s wrongdoing. 
Like Zhu, Whitlock does not refer to the Euthyphro dilemma; unlike Zhu, however, 
Whitlock’s asserted commonality, the assumption that justifies the comparative exer-
cise, is implicit. What is interesting from a methodological perspective, as we shall 
see presently, is how Whitlock distinguishes filial piety from piety generally. First, 
however, let us look at his commentaries on the passages.
For Whitlock, that the father in Analects 13:18 has done a wrong of which the 
son knows and which the son judges wrong is a “fact”; however, he continues, of 
central importance to the passage is what Confucius means by “conceal” (yin), that 
is, the character that Lau in his translation of the passage (which we quoted above) 
renders as “cover up.” Whitlock assumes that Confucius means “to not say publicly 
what he knows about the crime,” but does not mean that “the son should lie in 
public about his father’s innocence.”30 He then investigates a number of reasons a 
Confucian might produce as to why Confucius reacts the way that he does, while 
also referring to some arguments from within Confucianism as to why an interpreta-
tion of Confucius as saying that a son should never and nowhere report his father is 
inaccurate.
For instance, Whitlock addresses the argument that a son would not turn his fa-
ther in because such a public accusation would undermine the structure of the fam-
ily by taking over the authority of the father and by threatening a continuity with his 
ancestors that family members must maintain. Yet Whitlock lists conflicting demands 
on the son, such as Confucius’ insistence that a son should follow the ways of the 
father for three years after the father’s death, which cannot possibly include the idea 
that a son should imitate his father’s wrongdoings. Further, everyone should try hard 
to become a junzi, that is, an “exemplary person” or “gentleman,” who by defini-
tion is “honest,” and honesty runs counter to complicity in wrongdoing. Finally, an 
exemplary person is not to be blindly obedient (15:37), and a son is not to be simply 
silent when faced with a wrongful father, but is to “remonstrate gently” (4:18). A son, 
therefore, according to Whitlock, “may remonstrate with the father over the theft, but 
if spurned, should not publicly accuse.”31 If remonstrance fails, the son effectively 
remains complicit; Whitlock suggests that a son may try to avoid the problem of com-
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plicity by adopting the belief that good intention was what mattered, but this belief 
will not work because part of the son’s intention is “to continue remaining silent.”32
Another argument against publicly accusing one’s delinquent father follows yet 
a different line of reasoning. Whitlock points out that many passages in the Analects 
stress self-cultivation. These passages could be used to support the argument that the 
purpose of self-cultivation is to improve oneself and not to make accusations against 
others. Exemplary persons, for example, are said to “make demands on themselves, 
while petty persons make demands on others” (15:21). However, Whitlock observes 
that the son’s knowledge of his own complicity would eventually infringe irredeem-
ably on the effort of self-cultivation.
Whitlock then argues that in extreme cases such as a father’s continuing mis-
conduct—cases addressed neither by 13:18 nor anywhere else in the Analects—
Confucius may endorse a concerted action by the family reporting the father to the 
authorities.33 Whitlock substantiates his argument by referring to a clan rule, that is, 
a specific rule within a sort of intra-family law code, which he believes was written 
with Analects 13:18 in mind and which lists concrete wrongdoings such as infringing 
on the property of other people as well as concrete procedures for handling an irre-
formable family member, including the possibility of reporting this person to the civil 
authorities. Whitlock’s conclusion is that a “dishonorable father’s actions ultimately 
must not be allowed to undermine the moral advance of family members, including 
the son.”34
After setting out his reading of Analects 13:18, Whitlock turns to the Euthy-
phro and highlights what he considers to be resemblances between Confucius and 
Socrates as to the question of filial piety. Like Confucius, he argues, Socrates is per-
plexed that one family member would denounce another, as family relations are to 
him “truly . . . exceptions to moral law.”35 Euthyphro responds that what counts is 
whether or not the killer has killed lawfully. Socrates—in Whitlock’s view, and again 
like Confucius—is skeptical whether “anyone would know the right thing to do in 
such a case.”36 Notwithstanding the prolonged and inconclusive deliberation on 
the nature of piety in the dialogue, however, Whitlock claims that Socrates’ notion 
of filial piety “lurks between the lines of the dialogue” and may be summarized as: 
“Filial piety requires a strict loyalty to the father excluding all public accusations.”37
It should be noted that Whitlock takes differences seriously. He mentions, for 
example, that Confucius is confronted with the theft of a sheep, while Socrates is 
dealing with the manslaughter of a slave who is a murderer. However, for Whitlock, 
this difference does not undermine their common view that “a son should protect his 
father from accusation,”38 but Whitlock acknowledges also that there are some “ma-
jor differences” that threaten to undermine the resemblances between the passages 
under comparison: chief among these differences is that “Confucius is interested 
entirely in filial piety, while Plato is interested in piety-in-general, whether it be filial, 
legal or religious.”39
Since Analects 13:18 is, in Whitlock’s opinion, about filial piety, he sets out to 
show that one can examine filial piety as a separate dimension in the Euthyphro. He 
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suggests that there are good reasons to believe that we can treat filial aspects of piety 
as distinct from religious and legal piety. “Indeed,” he observes, “the early scenes of 
Euthyphro clearly emphasize the filial connotations of piety.”40 He then concludes 
that it is appropriate to compare the Socratic stance on filial piety with regard to the 
practical issue of a son accusing his own father. He suggests that we can therefore 
consider the filial connotations of piety vis-à-vis the issue “without worrying that we 
ignore a more fundamental and decisive connotation.”41 What Whitlock seems to 
have done is to have produced—or, perhaps more accurately, artfully constructed—
an argument supporting the assertion that both Confucius and Plato (or Socrates) are 
interested in precisely the same question of filial piety and that based on this com-
monality the two might be fruitfully compared.
But how sound is this asserted commonality? It could be argued—even if we 
assume both Confucius and Socrates to be responding to the practical issue of a son 
accusing his father—that there are still differences between Confucius and Socrates 
that run deeper and that the constructed commonality is in fact a misconstruction. 
For one thing, what significance does the “practical issue” have for Confucius and 
Socrates? On a contextualist reading of Analects 13:18, Confucius is not interested 
in pronouncing a truth about filial piety as such or a definition that applies to all its 
instances; he simply offers his opinion on what he thinks would have been appro-
priate for the son to do under the given circumstances. For Confucius, the practical 
issue of a son accusing his father is of interest without a view to theory. Similarly, it 
is inseparable from the concrete situation presented to him. He does not engage the 
question abstractly; what he does is to relate the concrete situation to his own con-
text. Socrates, in turn, is interested in the practical and concrete situation only with a 
view to the theoretical and abstract, that is, insofar as it is an instance of piety as such 
or, if we accept Whitlock’s argument, of filial piety as such. Plato has Socrates move 
away from questions about the relationship between father and son to the dilemma 
about the intrinsic character of the action abstractly considered.
Surprisingly, Whitlock himself, at one point in his discussion, writes much in 
the vein of this objection. In his conclusions, he states that Confucius “spends a 
tremendous amount of effort thinking about the family in realistic, concrete situa-
tions,” while Plato “spends little time on the family.”42 He further notes that Socrates 
is “chasing Euthyphro around a circle of definitions” and that the Euthyphro “is prob-
ably more important for its logical analysis of definitions than for a detailed con-
cept of filial piety, which it does not provide.”43 And, even more tellingly, Whitlock 
concedes that the question shifts from “Should a son publicly accuse his father of 
wrongdoing?” to “What is piety?” To the extent that Whitlock nonetheless takes the 
first of these questions as the common question of Confucius and Socrates, he can 
be said to Confucianize Socrates. In the light of these comments, Whitlock’s “final 
analysis” that Confucius “works through the pitfalls of the [issue] with greater detail” 
is clearly predicated on his asserted commonality and is not at all surprising consid-
ering that Plato (or Socrates) arguably does not address that issue at all.44 Certainly, 
both Confucius and Socrates respond to a situation of a son in light of his father’s 
misdemeanor, and to that extent the case for commonality might be argued. But Con-
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fucius responds with a view to the specific concrete situation and bearing his own 
context in mind; for Socrates the concrete situation is basically a pretext for raising 
the Euthyphro dilemma.
One Comparison “Socratizing” Confucius
Just as there is a danger of reading too much Confucius into Socrates, there is also a 
risk of reading too much Socrates into Confucius. We suggest that this is what Jiyuan 
Yu does in his study: Yu does include reference to the Euthyphro dilemma in his dis-
cussion, but his attempt to impose the issue in the Confucian context is in our view 
misplaced.
Yu’s basic assertion of commonality is that Socrates and Confucius can be re-
garded as the respective founders of Greek and Chinese ethics, as they both give 
“new meaning to religious beliefs and a new interpretation of the relation between 
the divine and the human.”45 Yu argues that none of the reasons that justify their status 
as inventors of ethics seems to be related to the “divine being,” but all are “secular” 
and “rational” reasons (he takes Confucius as formulating a ren “theory” in which 
“rationalism” plays a central role, while Socrates issues no less than a “manifesto for 
rationalism” in the Crito).46 However, despite their “respective rational grounds” for 
practicing ethics, Yu observes that both Confucius and Socrates claim to be on “a 
divine mission.”47
For Yu, in stark contrast to Zhu, it is apparent that the divine does play a notice-
able role in the thought of Confucius, and he refers to the passage—which he calls 
the “divine mission passage”—in Analects 3:24, where a visitor says to the disciples 
of Confucius, “The world has long been without the way [dao]. Heaven is about to 
use your Master as the wooden tongue for a bell.” Moreover, Yu points to Confucius’ 
claim in Analects 14:35: “There is no one who understands me. It is only Heaven 
that understands me.”48 Similarly, there is the “religious” Socrates, who claims to do 
philosophy by the god’s command because—purportedly, according to Yu, in “strik-
ing similarity” to Confucius—he “also claims to have a divinely ordered mission to 
investigate ethical issues.”49 Socrates declares at his trial:
I was attached to this city by the god—though it seems a ridiculous thing to say—as upon 
a great and noble horse which was somewhat sluggish because of its size and needed to 
be stirred up by a kind of gadfly. It is to fulfill some such function that I believe the god 
has placed me in this city.50
This leads Yu to remark, “As Heaven uses Confucius as the wooden clapper for a bell, 
the Delphic god uses Socrates as a gadfly.”51
The question addressed by Yu’s article is this: what precisely is the place of re-
ligion in the thought of Confucius and Socrates if they had independent, rational 
reasons for doing ethics: “Is the beginning of ethics based on a rational ground, or is 
it the result of divine command?”52 This looks very much like a version (albeit at one 
remove, so to speak) of the Euthyphro dilemma—are the ethical theories of Confu-
cius and Socrates based on, or derived from, divine will, or do they view the source 
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of moral authority as something that is rationally discoverable? In Yu’s analysis, how-
ever, the question appears to mean something else. He observes, for example, that 
commentators differ on what to make of Socrates’ commitments to rationalism and 
to the obedience to the divine command. What is noteworthy about the range of 
perspectives that Yu presents is that they do not appear to relate to the content of 
Socrates’ teaching—that is, to his views on the source of moral authority—but only to 
the matter of assuring him “of the moral certainty of his undertaking.”53 Perhaps this 
is not surprising given that Socrates did not develop a substantive ethical theory, but 
when Yu develops another response to the issue of whether the beginning of Chinese 
and Greek ethics is based on a rational ground or is the result of divine command 
through a different analysis of the Euthyphro dilemma, we find the suggestion, albeit 
implicitly, that Socrates’ method indicates where he stood vis-à-vis the dilemma.
It is clear from both the Apology and the Analects, Yu contends, that the divine 
mission is a direct prescriptive neither for Confucius nor for Socrates: “Each derives 
a belief from his own understanding that his mission is divine. . . . Both . . . believe 
that to conduct their respective missions is what the virtue of piety means.”54 In the 
Apology Socrates insists that philosophical activity is his service to the god, and, for 
Yu, this suggests a link between the Apology and the Euthyphro. In the latter, Euthy-
phro falls short of answering the question of what kind of service human beings can 
provide to the god:
[I]f we are allowed to relate this to Socrates’ claim in the Apology that his elenctic ex-
amination serves the god by improving the moral state of the human soul, we have an 
answer as to what service human beings can provide. According to this reading, Socrates, 
in saying in the Apology that his examination is a service to the god, means that his philo-
sophical activity is not impious, but represents what piety really is.55
Similarly, Yu claims, Confucius transmitting the tradition is analogous to what a filial 
son does to his father’s work, and “the purpose is to carry on and fulfill the dao em-
bodied in the tradition.”56 Moreover,
since a son’s transmission of his father’s work shows his virtue of piety, Confucius’s philo-
sophical activity of transmitting traditional value can also be regarded as his piety to the 
authentic tradition. Because tradition is where Confucius believes the dao of heaven is 
embedded, we can say that to be pious to tradition amounts to being pious to Heaven.57
This link with piety leads Yu to argue that neither Socrates nor Confucius simply 
adopts a voluntarist position. Rather, for each of them the “mission is divinely 
charged” because it is itself “meaningful.”58 What both do,
independently but commonly, is to combine the unique sense of the significance of their 
work to the traditional faith in the divine being, to the effect that what the divine being 
really wants from human beings is that we lead a meaningful and fulfilled life, and that 
the best way to be pious is to think about and find out the right way to conduct our lives.59
This, according to Yu is the “basis for the claim of divine mission.” At this junc-
ture in his analysis, Yu is using the Euthyphro dilemma to frame an analysis of the na-
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ture of Socrates’ and Confucius’ investigations. He refers to the Euthyphro dilemma 
and states: “We can ask the same question of Socrates’ own divine mission, and 
Confucius’s.”60
Yu’s comparison of Confucius and Socrates through the lens of the Euthyphro 
dilemma is misplaced with regard to both thinkers. As regards Socrates, Yu takes the 
Euthyphro dilemma out of the context to which it refers: the issue of the source of 
moral authority. It simply cannot be applied to Socratic thought because Socrates 
did not develop a response to the dilemma: his main contribution to ethical thought 
is the posing of the dilemma. There are of course strains of rationalism rather than 
voluntarism in Socrates’ view that the best way to be pious “is to think about and find 
out the right way to conduct our lives,” but this is primarily a reflection of Socrates’ 
basic modus operandi, not an ethical theory. (Rationalism becomes clear in later Pla-
tonic dialogues, where Plato shows that rationalism is intrinsic to the way we have to 
think about our lives; even if we say that we should obey the gods’ commands, we 
must give ourselves a reason for saying so.)
As regards Confucius, Yu implies that Confucius’ position is also essentially ratio-
nalist as opposed to voluntarist, but he does not explore the matter in any detail and 
therefore does not enlighten us as to why this might be the case. Given the nature of 
his comparison, one might expect an analysis of the basic principles of Confucian-
ism, inquiring into their origin and, in particular, addressing the question of whether 
they were conceived as somehow commanded—by a deity, say, or by principles 
derived from the sense of tradition in the abstract—or whether they were conceived 
as evident only (or first and foremost) from intelligent inquiry, that is, as rationally 
discoverable.
Yu, perhaps unwittingly, is wise not to press the issue of where Confucius’ thought 
might lie in terms of the Euthyphro dilemma. The point is that such an analysis (as 
much as the comparison of the nature of Socrates’ and Confucius’ investigations 
based on the Euthyphro dilemma) rests on a false basis. The choice between volun-
tarism and rationalism that is stipulated by the Euthyphro dilemma is simply absent in 
Confucianism. This is shown by the set of terms Yu employs when interpreting Confu-
cianism in order to advance his argument that the dilemma may be equally posed to 
Socrates and to Confucius. We would prefer terms that differ substantially from Yu’s, 
but our criticism is not in the first place directed at his terminology but rather at his 
omitting to make explicit his assertion of commonality. Making this explicit would 
involve reference to alternative interpretations and would require that reasons be 
stated why, in his opinion, these are not to be followed.
For example, consider Yu’s use of “Heaven” and of “the divine” in Confucianism. 
Yu informs the reader that “Heaven” is an English translation of the Chinese character 
tian, that it literally means “sky” but “has an impersonal ordering force.”61 He further 
concedes the limited “role of Heaven.”62 Yet it is by means of a debatable inference 
from Analects 17:19 involving “Heaven” that Yu comes to claim that “Heaven’s will 
is known through observation and understanding” and that this is also the manner in 
which “Confucius derives his sense of the divine mission.”63 Yu seems to suggest that 
“Heaven”—although not really saying anything or issuing any explicit commands—
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has a “will” of its own and stands in some relation to how Confucius’ mission is “di-
vinely” charged. Upon closer examination, however, Yu strikes an analogy between 
“Heaven” and “tradition,” culminating in the statement that, in Confucius, “to be 
pious to tradition amounts to being pious to Heaven.”64 Finally, Confucius’ “divine 
mission” is “divinely charged” because the “mission itself is meaningful.”65 In line 
with much scholarship, Yu appears to underline that for Confucius “the secular is 
sacred” (Herbert Fingarette’s famous phrase) and that by the time of Confucius tian 
has become impersonal as well as radically immanent. Ames and Rosemont, for 
example, are among those who argue that a strict notion of transcendence is absent 
from the concept. They describe tian as “both what our world is and how it is” and 
observe that it stands for “a cumulative and continuing cultural legacy focused in the 
spirits of those who have come before.”66
However, if Yu were to have had such an understanding of tian reflected in his 
terminology, he would not have been able to sustain as easily his asserted common-
ality, namely that both Confucius and Socrates are on a “divine mission.” In fact, it 
seems that the word “divine” means something very different to Confucius than it 
does to Socrates. This difference, however, is completely lost when Yu concludes that 
Confucius and Socrates both relate their work to the traditional faith in the divine be-
ing, the divine wish that we lead meaningful and fulfilled lives, and to the idea that 
the best way to be pious is to think about and find out the right way to conduct our 
lives. Yu’s presentation of Confucianism in terms such as “Heaven” and “divine”—let 
alone the “divine being”—suggests that there is a choice for Confucius to make and 
that “command” could possibly be one of the two options. Only thus can he ask 
whether Confucius is “Heaven’s missionary or a rational philosopher.”67
To understand Confucius as a “rational philosopher” is equally misconstrued. Yu 
does not explain how or in what sense one could speak of “rationalism” with regard 
to Confucius without deviating significantly from what the term might mean with 
regard to Socrates. For one thing, Yu himself remarks that Confucius “does not pres-
ent a sharp conflict between religion and rationalism.”68 We contend that this still 
understates the case, particularly in the absence of sufficiently detailed accounts of 
what “rationalism” and “religion” might and might not mean in a Confucian as op-
posed to a Socratic context.
We suggest that Confucius does not and cannot possibly pose the Euthyphro di-
lemma, and neither does or can it possibly pose itself to him. This, by itself, is no ob-
jection to using the dilemma for a comparison that involves Confucius. But any such 
comparison would require extensive and thorough explanation and argument as to 
how Confucius and Socrates can be portrayed in the same or similar terms. Anything 
short of this means no less than to Socratize Confucius radically because a compari-
son along the lines of the Euthyphro dilemma must impose an absolute choice on 
Confucius where there is none and where it is hard to find much material in the Ana-
lects to construct one. In our reading of Confucianism, whatever is constructed as 
being “commanded” by “tradition” is always appropriated and thereby changed and 
adapted to current circumstances. Confucius himself in Analects 9:3 might be read to 
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support an argument that a constructed choice between the “command” of “tradi-
tion” and the current ways of doing things defies an absolute answer:
The Master said, “A ceremonial cap of linen is what is prescribed by the rites. Today black 
silk is used instead. This is more frugal and I follow the majority. To prostrate oneself be-
fore ascending the steps is what is prescribed by the rites. Today one does so after having 
ascended them. This is casual and, though going against the majority, I follow the practice 
of doing so before ascending.”69
Conclusion: On Comparative Philosophical Analysis
What we do when we compare can, at one level, be approximated quite straightfor-
wardly as a two-stage process. First, every comparison must proceed from asserting 
one or more commonalities: assumptions and presuppositions are made, either ex-
plicitly or implicitly, to justify the comparative exercise in the first instance. Second, 
every comparison is interested in finding differences and similarities in two or more 
objects under scrutiny. These two stages are essential elements in any comparative 
analysis.
Think of a comparison between the “theories of the state” advanced by Plato in 
the Republic and by Hobbes in the Leviathan. The assertion of commonality at work 
in any such comparison is that both Plato and Hobbes had a “theory of the state.”70 
Leo Strauss, for example, speaks of a history of “the theory of the State” and, in one 
passage, explicitly compares the different ways in which Plato and Hobbes reach 
their depiction of the “right State.”71 Robin George Collingwood found any such as-
sertion utterly inappropriate. For him, it is simply that Plato and Hobbes did not both 
have a theory on a common object:
Obviously the political theories [Plato and Hobbes] set forth are not the same. But do 
they represent two different theories of the same thing? Can you say that the Republic 
gives one account of “the nature of the State” and the Leviathan another? No; because 
Plato’s “State” is the Greek πλι, and Hobbes’s is the absolutist State of the seventeenth 
century.72
To maintain that Plato and Hobbes both wrote on “the state” is to Collingwood no 
more than “logical bluff”; were one to investigate their presuppositions, essential dif-
ferences would come to the fore; for Collingwood, it is thus quite clear that “Plato’s 
Republic is an attempt at a theory of one thing; Hobbes’s Leviathan an attempt at a 
theory of something else.”73
Collingwood, to be clear, is not speaking out against all comparison whatsoever. 
Collingwood’s comments on comparing Plato and Hobbes reflect his view of textual 
interpretation more generally: for him, every statement by any author “is made in 
answer to a question,” and every question, in turn, “involves a presupposition.”74 
Collingwood does not say that one cannot possibly compare Plato with Hobbes; 
his suggestion is that any comparison of them should begin with a reflection of the 
respective questions these two authors attempted to answer and continue only if, or 
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only to the extent that, the case for a common question can be argued and supported 
appropriately. A general comparison between the Republic and the Leviathan must 
therefore consider whether Plato and Hobbes were trying to answer the same ques-
tion. Obviously, as Collingwood notes, they were not, but this does not, of course, 
rule out the possibility that some part or aspect of each of their theories might be 
fruitfully compared.
Comparative study, then, proceeds from identifying real and relevant similarities 
between the objects that are being compared. The initial assertion of commonal-
ity forms the basis for subsequent constructions; what is crucial is that similarities 
between objects under comparison are often mistaken for commonalities if assump-
tions or presuppositions are not considered properly. Shared terminology or vo-
cabularies are obvious cases where such similarities can be more readily assumed.
For example, when Roman lawyers spoke of iustitia or “justice” they meant some-
thing quite different from what modern thinkers mean when they use the same
term. For Roman lawyers, justice was the giving to each what is their due and was 
thus something to be discovered. By contrast, when modern philosophers use
the term, they often have substantive ideas in mind as to what constitutes justice 
and are thus thinking of principles or axioms of justice that should be followed or 
obeyed.75
The assertion and construction of commonalities plays an important role in 
comparison between Analects 13:18 and the Euthyphro dialogue. These asserted 
commonalities can be deconstructed in a number of ways. One might examine the 
historical background that informs the Analects and the Euthyphro, respectively, and 
see whether the commonality under scrutiny still holds. Alternatively, one might fo-
cus on the contemporary context or the subsequent narrative of the texts, that is, 
the history of reception of the Analects and the Euthyphro. We are almost sure to 
have constructed, without noticing it ourselves, one or more commonalities in the 
course of this essay. On reflection, for instance, although we do not suggest radical 
incommensurability, we have assumed that there is a Western as well as a Chinese 
“philosophical tradition,” but we have not produced any arguments for backing this 
assertion of commonality. Obviously, we cannot compare without constantly as-
suming or constructing commonalities. Our suggestion is that comparative study is 
beneficial only if at least guiding commonalities in a comparison are made transpar-
ent, critically questioned, and—if still embraced—justified in a thoroughly reasoned 
manner. Taking Confucius and Socrates either as addressing the same question of 
filial piety in Analects 13:18 and in the Euthyphro or as giving answers to the same 
dilemma is, we contend, a challenging task, if it is at all feasible.
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